What will replace the contingent of peacekeepers
Unrest in Kazakhstan struck like a bolt from the blue for everyone, including Turkey. Everything turned out to be so sudden that Turkey took an unusually long pause in assessing the rapidly unfolding situation.
The press release of the Turkish Foreign Ministry appeared only on January 5, the Organization of Turkic States (OTG) reacted only on January 6, and the OTG Council of Ministers gathered for its extraordinary meeting in the format of a video conference on January 11. Wide media coverage of what is happening in Kazakhstan began in Turkey after January 8.
Taking into account what Kazakhstan is for Turkey and what relations connect the two states, such a pause from the Turkish side turned out to be literally ringing.
< p>Let us remind you that Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independent states formed after the collapse of the USSR, including Kazakhstan. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan were established in March 1992 and will solemnly celebrate their thirtieth anniversary this year.
Kazakhstan, together with Turkey, became in 2009 one of the founding fathers of an organization designed to unite the Turkic world November last year, the name of the Organization of Turkic States.
In November last year, this very Organization adopted the program document “ Vision of the Turkic World-2040 '', which implies deep political and economic integration between the participating countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Among the observer countries & mdash; Hungary and Turkmenistan. Moreover, in these integration processes, it was Kazakhstan and its first president and elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev, who in Turkey is called the Turkic word “ aksakal '', which is understandable to native speakers of Russian, played a leading role.
In addition, Turkey & mdash; a major investor in the Kazakh economy, developing not only trade and economic, but also close humanitarian ties with Kazakhstan.
In general, the Turkish side had no reason to believe that it did not know or did not feel the processes taking place in Kazakhstan, so all the roads were beaten there. Let's make a reservation, Kazakhstan & mdash; for Turkey, this is not Azerbaijan with the slogan “ two states '' one people '', but Turkey perceives it as a relative and close ally in the construction of the Turkic world, with a strategic focus. If, for example, we think in terms of the Turkic world from China to the Balkans and an important Turkic section on the route of the global Chinese project Belt and Road.
So the news that Kazakhstan was engulfed in unrest, elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev not only left the post of head of the Security Council of Kazakhstan, but does not appear in public at all, they needed Turkish understanding, which eventually resulted in restrained press releases.
No less, and perhaps even a big shock in Turkey was the news that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, qualifying the events taking place in the country as “ external aggression '', with reference to the CSTO Charter, invited the organization's peacekeeping contingent, where Russia predictably played the first violin.
And the fact that the decision was announced by the President of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan & mdash; by the right of the chairmanship in the CSTO & mdash; became another foreign policy injection for Turkey.
According to Turkey, “I should have been in his place.” Turkey hoped that it was her directly, on the basis of bilateral agreements or in a multilateral format & mdash; as part of OTG, & mdash; Kazakhstan will invite to the role of a peacemaker. And let's be honest, the Turks have worked hard for this for all 30 years of Kazakh statehood, painstakingly establishing deep multifaceted relations with the Kazakhs.
However, to the next “ firing line ''; OTG and Turkey came second, losing to the CSTO and Russia.
By the time the Council of Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States met on January 11, the CSTO had already managed to bring a peacekeeping contingent to Kazakhstan, taking under protection the country's key infrastructure.
The CSTO had already managed to gather at the level of presidents of the countries & mdash; members of the organization. Moreover, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are simultaneously members of both the CSTO and the OTG, but they acted as part of the first of them.
Moreover, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev has already announced that the CSTO peacekeeping mission has been completed and that the withdrawal of military personnel from the country will begin as soon as possible, which will be carried out in 10 days.
Surprise from what is happening was in Turkey is so great that for many there came a moment of truth, right according to the well-known book by Vladimir Bogomolov, when the subject was placed in a position in which his true face was manifested. In this case, for a number of Turkish media and political observers, “ nuances '' appeared. relations with the Russian Federation.
No, of course, Russia does not pretend to enjoy fiery love among Turkish officials and political scientists: after all, relations between Russia and Turkey are & mdash; like a patchwork quilt or a Rorschach test, in which everyone sees something different. Areas of close cooperation and interdependence are interspersed with areas of competition, even to the point of occasional feuds.
However, the Russian and Turkish presidents have managed, up to the present time, to balance on this thin rope, observing “ decency '' in relations. Yes, and in Turkey, it is customary to watch your words and not openly demonstrate to your counterparts, including Russia, secret “ trembling feelings ''. And then the CSTO in Kazakhstan & hellip;
At the very first news of the transfer of the CSTO peacekeeping contingent from the pages of circulating Turkish publications, it sounded from venerable political analysts that it was nothing less than a “ Russian invasion of Kazakhstan ''. and that Russia is the main beneficiary of the processes taking place in the country. Following the textbook “ look for who benefits '', the picture turned out to be impartial for Russia.
Further & mdash; more: the opinion that he, they say, does not consider Kazakhstan a “ real state '', has spread from nowhere, but attributed to the President of Russia by Turkish analysts. And how do they behave with a fake state? That's right, they lead the case to a “ logical denominator. ''
Separately, it is worth noting the question, which was actively asked by Turkish observers, about how long the CSTO contingent will stay in Kazakhstan? After all, if he “ outlasts the set '', then he will inevitably cause a wave of “ Kazakh people's anger '' and anti-Russian sentiments towards themselves and towards the Russian population of Kazakhstan. We agree that this formulation of the question looks at least ambiguous.
And finally, the main idea that sounded these days in Turkey, & mdash; that the situation with the introduction of the CSTO contingent in Kazakhstan should become a kind of wake-up call, that is, a wake-up call for the Organization of Turkic States. The latter should finally receive a military-political dimension, its own Turkic peacekeeping contingent and a mechanism for its use.
That “ the main condition for development and cooperation is security and stability '' and therefore, cooperation between security and intelligence units should be “ more organized and institutional within the Organization of Turkic States, '' Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said at an online UTG summit on January 11. And, as it seems, this will be the main issue of the OTG in 2022, when the Organization is chaired by Turkey.
How to assess such actions and statements addressed to Russia? I have said it many times and I say it again: they should be regarded calmly, as words and statements emanating from a country that, according to Sergey Lavrov's exhaustive statement, is a “ close partner '' for Russia. There is a long predicted, logical, sometimes extremely tough, without sentimentality, competitive process between the two countries, each of which perceives the post-Soviet space as a zone of its vital interests. We are used to thinking that only Russia perceives this space as such. Perhaps I will “ please '' someone by saying that Turkey, too, is claiming influence in the post-Soviet space.
In another intricate turn of history, in January 2022, Russia, with its integration initiatives and influence, bypassed Turkey & mdash; with her notions and with her weight. You shouldn't underestimate what happened, but you shouldn't exaggerate either: yes, Russia has (so far) bypassed Turkey in the operational and skillful use of hard power. But no one denies that Russia has tough power and that it skillfully uses it when necessary.
However, the impact of & mdash; the thing is complex and, consequently, competition is going on along the entire perimeter of relations, and not only in one particular aspect. Here we can talk about trade and economic relations, and about direct investment, and about humanitarian cooperation, and about the so-called “ soft power ''.
If you look at any of these components, it is unlikely that Turkey is far behind Russia in terms of them. And in terms of that very soft power & mdash; followed by a purely personal value judgment & mdash; and even ahead of Russia, in particular, actively using his idea of the “ century-old revival of the Turks '' in contrast to the stalled domestic “ Eurasianism ''. The Turkic world as an idea in the current conditions has become a serious geopolitical factor strengthening its influence before our very eyes. But 'Eurasianism' has not yet fired to the extent that Russia could count on it.
Hence the serious concern about what will happen after the passions in Kazakhstan calm down?
I would like that the introduction of the CSTO contingent into Kazakhstan would not become a kind of march on Pristina & mdash; a resonant step with minimal subsequent effect for Russia, if you leave out the brackets “ big Kazakh thank you. '' A genuine partnership must be balanced in terms of taking into account the interests of both parties – & mdash; let's talk directly and pragmatically.
Yes, the stability and security of Kazakhstan and the long land Russian-Kazakh border & mdash; in Russian interests. However, this is for Russia & mdash; minimum “ non-combustible amount ''. But what exactly, in addition to this fireproof amount, Russia will receive from partnership with Kazakhstan and from its readiness to promptly come to the aid of the Kazakh leadership, which will leave behind the Russian peacekeeping contingent leaving Kazakhstan, in addition to the loud appointment of the Minister of Information and Social Development, apparently in as a “ goodbye wave of the hand '' & mdash; this is a big question with no answer yet & hellip;